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THE FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY IN NEW MEXICO
1858-1880, IV
By FRANK D. REEVE
CHAPTER

IX

MESCALERO APACHE
The Southern Apache Indians in New Mexico were
divided into two groups: The Gila, that lived west of the
Rio Grande, and the Mescaleros that lived east of the river,
in the White and Sacramento mountains. The Mescaleros,
about 600 or 700 in number, suffered from internal dissension and had split into two bands; the more troublesome
group, known by the name of the Agua Nuevo band, under
chiefs Mateo and Verancia, lived in the vicinity of Dog
Canyon, in the Sacramento mountains. The White mountain group under Cadette constituted the bulk of the tribe
and busied themselves part of the time with farming operations at Alamogordo, about seventy miles southwest of
Fort Stanton and west of the Sacramento mountains.!
The Mescaleros constituted the same problem as did
the other Indian tribes, and Superintendent CoIlins proposed to adopt the same procedure in dealing with them;
namely, removal from the settlements to a reservation
where they would be out of contact with the white settlers.
H:e had in mind, in the winter of 1858, a reservation on the
Gila river where all the southern Apache could be united.
His argument for concentration was strengthened when a
skirmish occurred with the Dog Canyon group in F'ebruary,
1859. In retaliation for a raid on San Elizario, Lieutenant
H. M. Lazelle invaded the Indian stronghold and suffered a
defeat, losing three men and having seven more wounded. 2
1. Steck to CoIlins, 2/11/59, C1945/59. Steck to Major C. F. Ruff, 2/14/59.
C1972/59. Steck to Greenwood 5/14/60, S202/60. Steck, Annual Report, 8/10/58,
35 Congo 2 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, I, 547ff (974).
2. CoIlins to Denver, 2/22/59, C1945/59, and 1/24/59, C1902/59. Lazelle. Report.
2/18/59, 36 Congo 1 sesS. Sen. Ex. Doc. 2, II, 286ff (1024). Maj. Thos. H. Holmes to
A. A. A. G., 2/11/59, C1972/59.
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Until such time as the Mescaleros could be moved west
of the Rio Grande, efforts were made to end their nomadic
habits and start them on the road to a sl;lttled existence in
their own territory. The need of additional help for Agent
Steck in carrying out this policy led to the sending of
Archuleta to Fort Stanton in the spring of 1860. He was
instructed to start the Indians planting on the Penasco,
about thirty-five miles south of the fort, a site selected by
Steck as the most suitable one. A contract was made with
H. U. Beckwith to supply corn meal and beef to feed them.
The corn meal was furnished rather than the -whole corn
in order to prevent the Indians from turning it into whiskey
or tizwin. The agent was also instructed to get in contact
with the Dog Canyon hostiles and influence them to join
their brethren. 3
The career of Archuleta was short lived at Stanton, as
we have seen, and the work was carried on by Thomas Claiborn. In July he was distributing rations to 496 Indians;
some new ones had come in "and their conduct evidently
showed it was a venture with them as they were on the
qui vive the whole time." However, "they are delighted
with my kindness and patience, for it takes patience that
Job knew not to bear with them. But knowing how important it is to hold this tribe in check & believing that they
are not fully known to the Government as they ought to be,
I have suffered wearisomely with them."4
The peaceful status of the Mescaleros was partially
upset early in 1861, because a fight between the Gila bands
and miners led to the hostiles seeking aid from their kinsmen. This situation was later aggravated by the outbreak
of the Civil War, which resulted in the abandonment of
Fort Stanton. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Crittenden
led an expedition against the Mescaleros in March, but the
good results were only of a temporary nature. In view of
the past efforts made to help them, the superintendent felt
3.
4.

Collins to Archuleta, 3/20/60, C630/60.
Claiborn to Collins, 7/5/60, C631/60.
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that they were an ungrateful lot and that "They should, be
humbled and made to fear the power of the Gov't. . . ."5
This task was taken in hand by Carleton when he assumed
command of the Department of New Mexico. The olive
branch having been. spurned, the sword was now· to be
offered.
Colonel Carson was sent in September, 1862, with one
company of infantry, to reoccupy Fort Stanton, and four
companies of cavalry to operate against the Indians. He
was instructed, that
All Indian men of that tribe are to be killed
whenever and wherever you can find them. The
women and children will not be harmed, but you
will take them prisoners, and feed them at Fort
Stanton until you receive other instructions about
them. If the Indians send in a flag and desire to
treat for peace, say to the bearer [they broke the
peace during the Texan invasion] and you have
been sent to punish them for their treachery and
their crimes; that you have no power to make
peace; ... that if they beg for peace, their chiefs
and twenty of their principle men must come to
Santa Fe to have a talk here; but tell them fairly
and frankly ... that we believe if we kill sorrie of
their men in- fair, open war, they will be apt to
remember that'it will be better for them to remain
at peace than to be at war. I trust that this
severity, in the long run, will be the most humane
course that could be pursued toward these
Indians."6
This vigorous policy produced results very quickly.
Agent Labadi, who had been detailed by Collins to accompany Carson, brought· Cadette and a small party of Mes5. Collins to Greenwood, 3/3/61, C991/61. Lobadi, Annual Report, 9/25/62,
37 Congo 3 Bess. Hse. Ex. Doc. i, I, 391-93 (1156). Col. W. W. Loring to A. A. G.,
5/19/61, R. R., Ser. I, vol. I, p. 604.
6. Carleton to Carson 10/12/62, J. S. C., 1867, p. 100. Carleton to Thomas.
9/30/62,. R. R., Series I, vol. XV, p. 576.
Similar instructions were sent to Colonel Joseph R. West at Mesilla. From that
place Captain McCleave was to operate in' the Dog Canyon country. A third expedi.
tion under Captain Roberts operated from Fort Franklin, Texas. J. S. C., 1867, p. 99.
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caleros to Santa Fe in November. Carleton informed them
that they must abandon their country and go to the Bosque
Redondo where Fort Sumner had been established. The
post had been located there as a barrier to Mescalero raids
up the Pecos valley, as a protection against Comanche and
Kiowa ,raids into iNew Mexico, and to provide winter pasturage for cavalry horses. The Indians accepted the ultimatum and Carleton was led to hope that "The result of
this will be, that, eventually, we shall have the whole tribe
at Bosque Redondo, and then we can conclude a definite
treaty with them, and let them all return again to inhabit
their proper country." This hope was translated into instructions to Carson to send all captives to that place. 7
But by the spring of 1863, Carleton had changed his
mind about the location for the Mescaleros. To return them
to their former home did not fit in well with his broader
plan of opening the mineral and farming resources of the
Territory to the white man. Consequently, it was decided
to keep these Apache permanently at the Bosque Redondo. s
The same advantage was forseen as in the case of the
Navaho; the Mescaleros would have no convenient mountains for seeking refuge in if they managed to escape, and
they could be made self-supporting there,
The program started out auspiciously. Captain Joseph
Updegraff, in command at Fort Sumner, was instructed to
protect the captives against the plains Indians and to treat
them kindly. In the spring of 1863, Bishop Lamy agreed
to provide a priest for the reservation to teach the gospel'
and open a school; in keeping with this understanding the
secretary of war made Fort Sumner a chaplain post. 9
Scouting parties were kept in the field to force all the
7. Carleton to Carson, 11/25/62, J. S. C., 1867, p. 101; Carleton to Thomas,
11/9/62, J. S. C., 1867, p. 101. Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, 11/29/62, in K186/62.
8. Carleton to Halleck, 5/10/63, R. R., Ser.
vol. XV, p, 723. Carleton to
Thomas, 3/19/63, S. J. C., 1867, p. 106.
9. Carleton to Updegraff, 11/26/62" A. G. 0., LS 13, p. 195. Carleton to Thomas,
3/19/63 and 4/12/63, S. J. C., 1867, p. 106, 108. Carleton to Bishop Lamy, 6/12/63.
Ibid., p. 112.
Bishop Lamy recommended Joseph Fialon, expected back from France in August,
for the position. Ibi<!)" p. 117.
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Mescaleros onto the reservation and settlers began to return
to the farming lands in the Fort Stanton area. Finally,
when the Indians appeared reconciled to their new home,
Collins assumed formal responsibility for their management in March and, placed Labadi in charge. lO
The ideal of making the Indians self-supporting could
not ·be realized immediately, but some progress was made.
Under the guidance of the agent they planted 200 acres the
first season and realized a profit of $458 from the sale of
fodder to the post, which pleased them very much. But
this happy trend was marred by certain unfortunate episodes. In the first place, "A large proportion of the flour
sent them, was adulterated with ground plaster, scraps of
bread, and sweepings generally. Much of this was also
sour."ll A few of them sickened on such a diet, but even if
they could survive, such a ration was a bit uncertain. The
military passed the responsibility for feeding the Indians
to the civil officials on May 31. At the end of October funds
ran low and Steck requested Carleton to permit the Indians
to return to the mountains to supplement their larder from
the hunt, on their promise to return in the spring and plant
again. 12
<;
The plan advanced by Steck received scant consideration from Carleton :"1 fear that, from some mistaken philanthropy, the experiment of having these Indians domesticated will be sadly interfered with." The superintendent
could manage the Indians as he saw fit on the reservation,
Carleton agreed, but they "shall not leave" the Bosque
Redondo! 13 The problem of food was solved by the military
again issuing rations.
The second year on the reservation brought greater
prosperity, but also a new problem. The farming netted
10. Carleton to commander Fort Stanton, 4/10/63, S. J. C., 1867, p. 107.
Carleton to Thomas, 3/19/63, Ibid., p. 106. Collins to Dole 4/17/64, C791-64.
11. Updegraff to Carleton, 6/14/63, A. G. 0., LR 1865. Labadi to Capt. Ben
C. Cutler, 6/18/63, L165/63.
12. Carleton to Collins, 5/24/63, A. G. 0., LS 13, p. 499. Steck to Updegraff,
10/29/63, S236/64.
13. Carleton to Thomas, 11/15/63, S. J. C., 1867, p. 143.
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them $4,000 aside from the corn crop,. which was destroyed
by pests and their new neighbors, the Navaho. These latecomers caused the failure of the Mescaleros to become established permanently in their new home. Their corn was
purloined by the Navaho on the reservation and they were
raided twice by members of the same tribe still at large.
Intertribal battles also occurred and the Apache gradually
thought it was prudent to live elsewhere. As early as April,
1864, Ojo Blanco left temporarily, taking forty-two companions with him; fifty-three deserted in August, and on
November 3, 1865, the balance of the 425 that 'had been
rounded up, including a few Gila, fled to their old haunts,
except for a handfuJ.14
John L.Watts recommended in June, 1866, that the
Mescaleros be located on a reservation south of Fort Stanton. This proposal was not acceptable to the secretary of
the interior, until congress should sanction the abandonment of the Bosque Redondo. But, due to lack of funds to
finance the task of again taking the Indians in hand, the
Apache were free agents for the next three years, roaming
their old territory into Texas and occasionally committing
some depredation. 15
When the control of the Indians in New Mexico was
transferred to the army in 1869, Lieutenant A. G. Hennisee
was assigned to the Mescalero agency in July. He revived
the reservation plan and recommended that they be located
near Fort Stanton, but the proposal could not be carried out
immediately because of lack of funds ;16 nor was the lieutenant to be in charge when the move was finally completed
because the brief tenure of military control ended in 1870.
Robert S. Clark was appointed to the Mescaleros in November, but never took charge; he was succeeded in March,
14: Labadi to steck, 5/18/64, S372/64.
Labadi, Annual Report, 38 Congo
2 Sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 1, V, 347-48 (1246). Labadi to Dole, 5/1/64, L 405/64.
15. Watts to Harlan, 6/6/66, W320/66. Norton to Cooley, 7/6/66, N54/66.
Cooley to Norton, 8/18/66, LB 81, p. 204. Lieut. A. G. Hennisee to Gallegos,
7/31/69, C383/69.
16. Hennisee to Gallegos, 7/31/69, C383/69. Parker to Clinton, 8/7/69, LB 91,
P. 296. Hennisee to Clinton, 10/6/69, C583/69.

\.

\

I

J

f

THE FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY

267

;

1871, by A. J. Curtis, a protege of the American Unitarian
Association.
H'ennisee, meanwhile, had started negotiations with
his prospectiv.e wards in December, 1870, to induce them to
once more take up a settled existence. The Indians were
open to persuasion and by February a few were collected
at Fort Stanton under Jose La Paz, a minor chief. He was
soon sent out to induce the rest of his kinsmen to come in
and returned with encouraging news. Another party was
dispatched for the same purpose early in the summer. As a
result. of these efforts the larger part of the Mescaleros
under Cadette had collected around Fort Stanton by July.
"The old chief in his native eloquence called on heaven and
earth to witness that they would live at peace; not at peace
to be broken, but a long peace."17
But Cadette was not destined to live long enough to see
his statement realized in practice, nor to be a party to the
future vicissitudes of his people, which were to be due to
the uncertainty of the reservation's boundaries, the scarcity
of food, the fraudulent machinations of L. G. Murphy and Co.
in cooperation with some of the agents, and the disorders
growing out of the Lincoln County war. He was mysteriously murdered in La Luz canyon while returning to Fort
Stanton from Mesilla in November, 1872. 18
With Indians actually on hand, the first attempt at defining the boundary of the reservation was made by Superintendent Dudley in the winter of 1872. .. In keeping with
his recommendation, the reservation was set aside by Executive Order of May 29, 1873, as follows:
Commencing at the southwest corner of the
Fort Stanton reduced military reservation, and
running thence due south to a point on the hills
near the north bank of the Rio Ruidoso; thence
17. Jackson to Editors, 7/20/71, in The Daily New ·Me"ican, 7/25/71. Lieut.Col. August V. Kautz to A. G., 4/13/71, A266/71. Kautz to Pope, 2/9/71, P124/71.
Curtis to Pope, 8/10/71, P463 1/2/71.
18. Curtis to Pope, 11/14/72, P236/72. The Daily New Mexican, 11/25/72,
12/18/72, 12/24/72.
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along said hills to a point above the settlements;
thence across said river to a point on the opposite
hills, and thence to the same line upon which we
start from Fort Stanton; and thence due south to
the thirty-third degree north latitude; thence to
the top of the Sacramento Mountains, and along
the top of said mountains to the top of the White
Mountains; thence along the top of said mountains
to the headwaters of the Rio Nogal, to a point op- .
posite the starting point, and thence to the starting
point." 19

This area lay along the eastern slopes of the White and
Sacramento mountains; and it was not an entirely satisfactory location. The starting of the boundary at the southwest corner of the military reservation largely excluded
the Indians from the arable land lying along the small
streams flowing eastward into the Pecos river. Furthermore, they were too far removed from the agency and they
were reluctant about living in the mountains during the
cold season, although they desired that region for hunting. 20
In order partly to correct these deficiencies a second
reservation was laid out as follows:
Beginning at the most northerly point of the
Fort Stanton reduced military reservation; thence
due west to the summit of the Sierra Blanca Mountains; thence due south to the thirty-third degree
north latitude; thence due east to a point due
. south of the most easterly point of the said Fort
Stanton reduced military reservation; thence due
north to the southern boundary of township 11;
thence due west to the southwest corner of township 11, in range 13; thence due north to the second correction line south; thence due east along
said line to a point opposite the line running north
from the thirty-third degree north latitude; thence
due north to the most easterly point of said Fort
Stanton reduced military reservation; thence
along the northeastern boundary of said military
reservation to the place of beginning. 21
19.
20.
21.

Kappler. I. 871, The Daily New Mexican, 1/17/73.
S. B. Bushnell, Answers to Medical Circular, 7/29/73, B689/73.
Kappler, I, 871, Exec. Order, 2/2/74.
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The new boundaries included more arable land east of the
mountains and more hunting ground on the western slope
of the Sacramento mountains.
But yet the boundary was not entirely satisfactory.
The use of metes and bounds partly in defining the line was
not satisfactory because of the broken nature of the country. So to avoid indefiniteness, and to include certain
grasslands in the White mountains, the boundary was defined for the third time:
Beginning at the most northerly point of the
Fort Stanton reduced military reservation; running thence due west to a point due north of the
northeast corner of township 14 south, range 10
east; thence due south along the eastern boundary
of said township to the thirty-third degree north
latitude; thence due east on said parallel to a
point due south of the most easterly point of the
said Fort Stanton reduced military reservation;
thence due north to the southern boundary of
township 11; thence due west to the southwest
corner of township 11, in range 13; thence due
north to the second correction line south; thence
due east along said line to a point opposite the line
-running north from the thirty-third degree north
latitude; thence due north to the most easterly
point of said Fort Stanton reduced military reservaiton; thence along the northeastern boundary of
said military reservation to the place of beginning."22
Needless to say, these attempts to provide a definite
boundary to include proper lands for the use of a settled
people had no immediate influence in keeping the Indians
within those lines. They continued to wander over their
traditional territory, sometimes by permission of the
agents, at other times as it suited their needs and convenience. This habit would have aroused little comment if the
Mescaleros had behaved themselves, but at times they re22. Kappler, I, 872, Exec. Order, 10/20/75. Smith to McNulta, 7/14/75, LB
126, p. 88. Smith to secretary of interior, !\j29/75, RB 27, p. 2. Smith to Crothers,
9/28/75: LB 126, p. 852.
-
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sorted to the usual Apache custom of purloining stock.
For two years after the return of part of this tribe to the
reservation under the leadership of Cadette, there was no
trouble, but in the spring of 1873 the depredations became
sufficiently noticeable to call for military action.
Major Price started operations from Fort Stanton in
September, 1873. He was handicapped by lack of knowledge of the country, but in the course of the fall months the
r.egion was mapped, the traffic in stolen stock, in which both
Indians and whites were concerned, was broken up, and a
few of the Indians, feeling the pressure of the military,
returned to the reservation. This aggressive action restored a measure of tranquillity, but the military believed,
and rightfully so, that "so long as they are permitted to
entertain the notion that they are entirely safe on their
reservations, no matter what they may do away from them,
it will be impossible for the military force to prevent marauding and give protection to the scattered settlements."23
Along with the problem of keeping the Indians on the
reservation was the corollary of proper management, and
this was badly marred by the spoils system. L. G. Murphy
and Co. were the business dictators of the Fort Stanton
region. They owned the only store and were the actual
Indian agent despite the presence of Curtis. In addition,
they held the position of post trader for the military.
Rations were issued to the Indians without orderly or systematic procedure, and the number was grossly exaggerated, whereby the government was defrauded. Contracts
for supplies were let under their influence and of course
to their benefit.
. When Samuel B. Bushnell took over the agency from
Curtis, on April 2, 1873, vigorous steps were taken to break
the hold of L. G. Murphy and Co. on Indian affairs. They
had earlier been removed as post trader, but were influential enough to prevent a successor and consequently con23. J. Irvin Gregg's endorsement on Price's Report, 2/28/74, W498/74. Bushnell
to Price, 2/7/74, W403/74. The Daily New Mexican, 8/14/72.
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tinued to enjoy the benefits from trade with the soldiers
whom they charged exorbitant prices. But. that was a side
issue with Bushnell; his main interest was in securing
separate quarters for his own business and becoming the
agent in fact as well as in law. In carrying out this program, he naturally encountered opposition; he accused
Murphy of saying, "It don't make any difference who the
Government sends here as Agent. We control these
Indians."24
Economy was immediately effected in the number of
rations issued. .About 400 Indians were receiving bounty
in 1871; by the end of the Curtis regime the numheron
paper had risen to 2679, "a rapidity of increase," the new
agent remarked, "which leaves rabbits rats & mice in the
shade." Next, in order to secure a greater degree of independence for Bushnell, the Murphy building was purchased
by the government in May at a cost of $8,000 for agency
quarters. The price was doubtless exorbitant in view of
the cheapness of adobe construction in New Mexico, but·
it was a move in the right direction. Murphy transferred
his business to the nearby town. of Lincoln in September.
As a result of these measures the new agent was led to
state that "all are now of the opinion that I have broken the
backbone. of the Indian ring in New Mexico, and the most
formidable anti-administration party in the Territory."25
But Bushnell was unduly optimistic about his success.
The so-called Iridian ring in New Mexico' had not been
broken and his tenure of office closed toward the end of the
year; "though an honest and well meaning man, [he] was
deficient infirmness and decision of character, and hence
could not with any considerable degree of success, meet the
responsibilities of his position." 26
24. Bushnell to Dudley, 5/1/73, D78/73.
25. Ibid., and 6/4/73, B428/73.
26. Smith to Delano, 2/16/74, RB 24, p. 107.
For the period of Curtis' and Bushnell's agency see also The Daily New Mexican.
10/8/72; RB 23, .p. 489; LB 102, p. 411; LB 107, p. 320 :LB 111, p. 156; LB 114.
p. 108'; B1134/73, C281/73, D78/73, D107/73, DllO/73, D162/73, D1564/73, D561/73,
D708/73, W641/74, W1064/73, W1323/73, T72/73, 1866/73.
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His successor, W. D. Crothers, fared little better in
managing the Mescaleros, but he also tried to improve conditions. The location of the agency on the Fort Stanton
military reservation, although in separate quarters purchased from Murphy, did not allow the new agent the freedom that he thought necessary for his task. Furthermore,
a post trader, Captain Paul Dowlin, had finally been appointed and had rented part of the building from Bushnell.
He had the rightto sell liquor, a chronic source of difficulty
in the management of Indians. Under these circumstances,
being unable to oust Dowlin and end the sale of whiskey to
his charges, the agent moved his quarters off the military
reservation to Copeland's Ranch, eight miles away.27 In the
course of time it was again removed farther away to South
Fork, about forty miles from Fort Stanton.
Other problems for Crothers to cope with lay in the
frontier spirit of retaliation against Indians in general for
the depredations of the few, and the inherent lawlessness
that seemed to characterize some white men.· In the fall of
1874, armed bands raided the Mescaleros on the reservation
and caused part of them eventually to·flee to the mountains.
The military followed in an effort to bring them back, but
they only stampeded again. Another raid occurred in J anuary, 1875, the participants "claiming to have got away
with three scalps and about seventy-five horses." The
remaining Indians retaliated, which in turn brought reprisals until only about fifteen or twenty were left on the
reservation. 28
The agent had little confidence in the use of soldiers to
secure the return of the run-a-ways and proceeded to make
contact with them by special messengers. In the course of
27. Crothers to Smith, 8/1/74, C627/74. Crothers to post adjutant, 7/18/74,
C595/74. Godfrey to Smith, 10/27/76, G351/76.
Crothers cited a military order of 1870 forbidding the entry of Indians on a
military reservation as a reason for moving, but it is reasonable to believe that the
order had not been operative at Fort Stanton. There was also some friction with
the War Department over the use of the building on the Stanton reservation as
agency headquarters. See C92/75, W211/75, C247/75.
28. Crothers to Smith, 1/8/75, C141/75. C. I. A., Annual Report, 1875, p. 329.
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the spring and summer of 1875, most'of them had been induced to return. Meanwhile, in order to provide better protection for his charges, Crowthers secured some arm's and
ammunition to arm his, employees and a few citizens nearby
who were interested in preserving order on the reservation.
And again hopeful of promoting their progress toward
civilization, the sporadic farming operations of the past
were resumed. 29
In the midst of these disturbances, his position had
been made more difficult by the usual machinations of outside parties. Murphy, the' "champion of Democracy,"
apparently was not able to influence Crothers to his own
advantage. The agent was, consequently, accused of using
government supplies in providing hotel accommodations for
travelers, and of reporting the issuance of 400 rations when
only 227 Indians were present to receive them. He was
indicted October 1, 1874, ona trumped-up charge of operating a hotel without a license. Crothers plead not guilty and
the case was finally dropped by the district attorney who
was skeptical of the validity of the affair. However, the
secretary of war charged him with dereliction of duty in the
matter of the killing of Ind.,ians on the reservation by
ra.iders. This accusation led to the appointment of a spechtl
investigator by the office of Indian affairs. On the whole,
the evidence favored the agent, but he finally resigned his
position in the spring of 1876.30
Fred C. Godfroy assumed charge of the agency July 1,
1876, and was soon contending with the forces of lawlessness, shortly to be enhanced by the outbreak of the Lincoln
County War. Sporadic charges of depredations by the Mescalel'OS during his two years in office continued to be made,
29. B. I, C., Annual RepOTt, 1875. p. 97. C135/76. C248/75, C138/76.
30. Crothers to Smith, 3/3/75, C345/75.
Smith to secretary of interior,
3/10/75. 1284/75. Office of Indian Affairs, Special Case 108. New Mexico, Lincoln
County, Criminal Docket, case 99, vol. A, p. 34, 48.
"IIi New Mexico, the military at Fort Stanton were called upon to protect the
Mescalero Apaches, but were not able to prevent their massacre by whites on their
own reservation, and within sight of the flag-staff of the miiitary post." C.I.A.,
Annual RePOTt, 1875, p. 34.
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though some were of doubtful truth. 31 However, one disturbing incident was left by Crothers for immediate han-.
dling. The Mescaleros left the reservation in June, 1876,
apparently on a spree as a result of too much consumption
of whiskey. The military took up the pursuit immediate and
about half the band promptly returned. Peaceful measures
were adopted to bring back the remainder, Godfroy employing J. A. Jucero at a price of $1.50 per man and $1.00 per
woman and child to round them up. This was a profitable
undertaking, since he secured the return of 147. A love
feast was then held in December and for the time being
affairs quieted down. 32
The outbreak of the Lincoln County war in the spring
of 1877 caused a greater degree of disorder to develop and
the Mescaleros were of course regarded as fair game. A
party invaded the reservation in August, 1877, and ran off
some agency stock, the military failing to catch them, they
reported, because rain obliterated the trail. For better
protection and because of the delay necessary in informing
the army post of marauders, Godfroy secured arms from
the war department for the employees and some of the Indians. 33 But a year later the agency clerk, Bernstein, was
killed by Billy the Kid when he attempted to prevent the
outlaws from repeating their exploit of stealing stock. 34
In the midst of these difficulties, Godfroy was striving
to promote the welfare of his charges. They were sadly
lacking in clothing, and of course insufficient rations was an
31. "The reports .of Indian depredations I believe are much exaggerated, and
in my, opinion ranchers even are much to blame for these reports by harboring
disreputable characters on their premises. who are in my opinion much worse than
the Indians." Captain Henry Carroll to post adjutant, 9/22/16, W1180/76.
Sheridan to Townsend, 4/30/78, W1/79. Lieut. Col. Dudley to A. A. A. G.,
5/24/78, W1082/78'. Capt. L. H. Carpenter to post adjutant, Fort Davis, 7/24/78,
W1549/78.
32. Captain George A. Purington to A. A. A. G., 6/19/76, and Hatch to
A. A. G., 6/29/76, W796/76. Godfroy to Smith, 7/22/76, G185/76; 8/10/76, G227/76;
11/10/76, G375/76; 11/24/76, G386/76; 12/23/76, G35/77.
33. Godfroy to Smith, 8/12/77, M676/77; 9/18/77, M735/77. Secretary of war
to secretary of interior, 10/8/77, W938/77. See also M761/77, W300/78.
34. A detailed account of the Lincoln County War can be found in Pat F.
Garrett's, Billy the Kid, supplemented by George W. Coe, Frontier Fighter.
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intermittent state of affairs. After one woman had perished
from the cold, and possibly several others, he purchased 200
blankets and 2,000 yards of muslin without specific authorization from Washington, although a long delayed order had
finally been placed in New York for supplies. His action
was advisable in view of the fact that suffering was bound
to make the Mescaleros more restless than usual and the use
of force to keep them on the reservation was hardly possible
since the military had need of their resources in dealing
with the Gila bands. The liquor traffic was again attacked
by establishing troops at Tularosa in September 1878, to
prevent the Indians from making their purchases there
and at La Luz, a small village lying between the reservation and Tularosa. 35 And to cap his efforts, a school was
established for Indians January 1, 1878. 36 But, despite all
his work during these two years, conditions were never
satisfactory; the planting activities suffered and again in
1878 some of the Indians scattered into the mountains, seeking both security and means of subsistence. 37
Godfroy possessed 'certain qualities that made a good
agent, but he succumbed to the temptation that lay in the
path of any member of the Indian service, the opportunity
to profit more than the salary of his position provided; consequently, his career with the Mescaleros came to an abrupt
ending. One critic wrote that Godfroy was known as the
"Presbyterian fraud," and that "The fraud, corruption and
dishonesty of the agent can be established by cumulative
evidence in the shape of affidavits." Dr. Lowrie hoped for
vindication of this latest appointee under the Peace Policy
of President Grant because "Both his predecessors, nominated by our Board, were bitterly assailed-and so far as we
could learn without any warrant." 38
35. Godfroy to Hayt, 4/22/78, G244/78; 7/27/78, G379/78; 1O/2/78,G457/78.
And see W2028/78.
36. Godfroy, Report, 9/1/77, 45 Congo 2 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. I, VIII, 550-54
(1800) .
37. Godfroy to Smith, 8/21/76, G244/76; 9/14/76. G263/76; 12/8/77. M931/77;
8/22/78. 45 Congo 3 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. I, IX. 603. Hayt to Godfroy, 3/19/78, LB 145,
p. 497. See also 1370/78.
38. A. M. McSween to Lowrie. 2/25/78. and Lowrie to Hayt. 3/15/78, LI47/79.
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His hopes were fruitless. The agent had not actively
participated in the Lincoln County War, but he was favorable to Murphy and J. J. Dolan, the leaders of one faction,
the second of whom had had the beef and flour contract for
the agency for two years. It is hard to arrive at the truth of
the conflicting evidence advanced for and against Godfroy
by the parties to such a violent frontier quarrel, but doubtless the agent had committed breaches of the law, a too common practice in his line of work. Inspector Angel was
"strongly impressed to the belief that Godfroy" had cheated
the government by turning in a fraudulent number of Indians, but in view of his otherwise able management of
affairs recommended that he be permitted to resign; in the
event of refusal he should be dismissed. He was also
accused of lending supplies to L. G. Murphy and Co., and
later to J. J. Dolan and Co., successors, although without
profit to himself. Consequently, he was discharged; his
most earnest plea that "I be reinstated" was without avai1. 39
John A. Broadhead was appointed successor to Godfroy but never took charge. Upon his arrival in Santa Fe,
somebody plied him with exaggerated stories about current
conditions in Lincoln County, according to Governor Wallace, which so demoralized him that "he went all to pieces"
and left for the East. It is only fair to add that the state of
his health may have had something to do with his reluctance to venture into such a lawless country. At any rate,
"A thorough man" was needed and S. A. Russell, late of
the Abiquiu agency, was believed to be capable of filling
the position.40
The new appointee requested that only a small bond
($10,000) be required because the responsibility of the
agency was small and "confidence has been so betrayed and
destroyed within the last two years as to make it an ex89. A. M. McSween to Schurz, 2/11/78, M819/79.
Robt. A. Widenmann to Schurz, 3/11/78, W384/79. Anonymous to Carl Schurz,
10/27/77, 1772/77. Frank Warner Angel, Report, 10/2/78, A713/78. Godfroy to
Hayt, 11/21/78, G6/79. Hayt to secretary of interior, 12/28/78, RB 33, p. 108.
40. Lew Wallace to Schurz, 11/10/78, N278/78.
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tremely delicate matter to ask a friend to endorse you." He
.relieved Godfroy in April, 1879, and found himself in the
midst of the War. Cattle stealing had become a fine art,
although it was not a recent practice, but Russell disap~
proved of Governor Wallace's plan of bills of sale from the
vendor of cattle twice removed and certified brands as a
means of checking the evil. He favored rather the declaration of martial law. "Is it not a fine country," he asked, "in
which to civilize the Indians? Would anything but the
Munificent Salary induce a man to undertake it? And yet I
do have hope of the gradual improvement of these
Indians."41
He did not remain long enough to realize his hope, the
times were too turbulent even for him. Victorio was a disquieting influence on his charges and the military policy
finally adopted toward them was not to his liking. He was
reluctant at first to receive any of the Warm Springs Indians, but finally extended an offer of asylum to Victorio in
the summer of 1878, an act, he admitted later, that was a
mistake insofar as the management of the Mescaleros was
concerned. When the Gila leader departed, a few of the
Mescaleros left with him; others were depredating in Texas,
and so severely were their activities felt east of the Pecos
that the withdrawal of troops from Fort Stanton was dismissed as impossible because it would be an open invitation
for a Texan punitive expedition to wipe them out. 42 As for
those that followed the Warm Springs leader, it was
planned to dismount and disarm them upon their return,
and, if necessary, to imprison them in the guard house or
subject them to the beneficial effects of honest labor. The
military, at least, had almost lost hope for these unfortunate
savages: "a miserable, brutal, race, cruel, deceitful, and
41. Russell to commissioner, 12/6./78,
6/18/79, R438/79. Wallace to Schurz, 4/25/79,
42. See Sherman's endorsement on Wm.
Report, 12/20/78, W219/79. Russell to Editor,

R846/78; 3/17/79, R212/79; and
N108/79.
Steele to A. G. (Austin, Texas),
8/16/79, in Thirty-Four, 8/27/79.
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wholly irreclaimable." Pope thought, "Vigorous and conclusive action" was necessary.43
An "conclusive action" was soon resorted to. When the
troops were relieved of the Victorio pursuit by his move
into Mexico, Hatch requested that all Indians with stock be
assembled at the agency. He arrived with about 1,000 soldiers and, apparently without consulting Russell in advance,
proceeded to disarm and dismount them on April 16, 1880.
A few escaped and ten others were killed in the attempt to
do the same. As a result of this move, about three hundred
were confined as prisoners of war until September, when
they were allowed freedom of movement within a radius of
eight miles of the agency. The remnants of the band gradually came in due to military pressure and promises made in
November that they would be protected on the reservation,
arms would be available for hunting, and two mares and
some other stock would be granted to each family. The individual who objected too strenuously to this policy was slated
for confinement in Leavenworth prison. Thus, after years
of intermittent hostilities, the Mescaleros had been deprived
of their resources for living off the reservation, horses and
arms. 44
The disarming of the Indians was accompanied with a
certain amount of harshness and suffering and the agent
was blamed by some of his charges for their plight. In
consideration of that state of affairs Russell "thot it prudent to resign." He may have-been over-prudent, but at
least one agent had departed without the accusation of
fraud being leveled at him. 45
43. Pope to Sheridan, 11/4/79, and Pope to A. A. G., 1/9/80, W864/80. Russell
to commissioner, 3/16/80, R310/80.
44. Russell to commissioner, 4/17/80, R434/80. Sheridan to Townsend, 4/20/80,
W841/80; R962/80.
45. Because beef was high priced, conditions unsettled, and the agent strict in
enforcing the terms of the contract, the representative of H. L. Newman and Company of East St. Louis advised his superiors to request a release from their beef contract rather than take a loss, advice that they followed. S. H. Newman to H. L.
Newman & Co., 4/22/80, N227/80.
.
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A subsequent move to oust the Mescaleros from the
Fort Stanton region because of mining activity on the western slope of the mountains came to nought in 1882.46 Their
homesite had been provided, but civilization was yet to be
achieved.
46. Petition to president, 12/15/80, A955/80 in Office of Indian Affairs, Special
Case 108. S. S. Stephens to Thomas, 5/27/82, LB 164, p. 848.
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CHAPTER X
THE GILA APACHE

Of all the Indian tribes that roamed the mesas and
mountains of New Mexico, the Apache in general, and those
living west of the Rio Grande in particular, were the worst
of the lot, in the eyes of the white man. The frontiersman
could admire their skill in hunting, and their marvelous
powers of endurance in traveling fifty to seventy-five miles
a day on foot, or a hundred miles on horseback; he could
marvel at their ability at deception, creeping into a military
post and killing some unfortunate soldier or teamster with
a lance or arrow; he might even grant them at times the virtue of keeping their plighted word and give them credit for
cunning tactics in fighting; but after the pros and cons had
been weighed, the opinion more apt to be arrived at was that
the Apache "is a viper, an untameable, ferocious, sanguinary monster, bent upon the destruction of all with whom he
comes in contact, and only restrained by fear." 1
For nearly three decades after the outbreak of the
Civil War, the soldiers, settlers, and miners waged intermittent war with these savages. They were gradually subdued and placed on reservations, but the marks of the conflict were long apparent to the eyes of the traveler. "The
many crosses dotting the roadsides of Southern Arizona
and New Mexico mark the graves of murdered men; indeed,
the country seems one vast graveyard, if we may judge by
the frequency of these rude memorials." 2 But for a few
years prior to that period, after the Bonneville campaign
1. John C. Cremony, "The Apache Race," in Overland Monthly, I, 205 (Sept.,
1868). The writer claimed "a close. personal acquaintance of over eight years" with
the Apache.
Cf: "Living among these people with practically no companionship except that
of the Indians themselves, my feelings toward them began to change. That illdefined impression that they were something a little better than animals but not
quite human; something to be on your guard against; something to be eternally
watched with suspicion and killed with no more compunction than one would kill a
coyote; the feeling that there could be no possible ground upon which we could meet
as man to man. passed away." Britton Davis, The Truth about Geronimo, p. 111.
2. Susan E. Wallace, The Land of the Pueblos, p. 155.
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against the Gila Apache in .1857, they remained at peace.
"So much so," Steck reported two years later, "that they
would not allow him to travel about for hunting or other
purposes without sending two of their people with him, for
fear some accident might happen and suspicion be thrown
upon them." 3
But the Bonneville expedition had another influence
that in the long run was not conducive to peace:
It has resulted also in bringing to notice a
valuable and fertile' portion of our Territory
on the headwaters of the Gila river and its tributaries, which otherwise would have remained unknown for years and our Territory still subjected
to the incursions of these roving bands regardless
of lives and property." 4

;.

With the whites coveting the reds' territory, it was only a
matter of a short time before contact between the two
races began to bring the usual problems and difficulties.
That of furnishing the Indians with sufficient rations to
supplement their hunting activities in lieu of depredating
for a living was immediately present.
The Mimbrefio band under Mangas Colorado hung
around the mines at Santa Rita and were a worry to the
property owners. Two of the savages accepted a job for
two days; but since the white man's kind of labor was not
to their liking, the necessities of life could not be provided
for them that way. Moreover, the native settlers secretly
traded bad powder and whiskey for stock stolen in Sonora.
Such trade goods were a bad combination. The whiskey
made easier the occurrence of some incident that might precipitate a fight and the powder, inferior though it may have
been, gave the savage a better means for killing than afforded by bow and arrow. And while the mine <?wners were
voicing their complaints in 1858, the Mimbrefios were starv.
3. Bonneville to Thomas, 7/15/59, 36 Congo 1 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 2, II, 306
(1024) .
4. New Mexico Legislative Assembly, Joint Resolution, January, 1858, 35 Congo
2 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, II, 279-80 (975).
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ing on a ration of eleven pounds of corn per month for an
adult and half that amount for a child. In order to view conditions at first hand, Superintendent Collins visited them in
the faJI; he distributed 300 blankets for about 600 Indians
and increased the ration slightly. But these measures were
only a partial reply to the complaint of the mine owners that
"these Indians must be fed-steal, or starve." 5
However. the government officials were also interested
in a more permanent solution to the Apache problem and
measures wer.e taken to make these Indians a settled people.
Under the tutelage of Steck, part of them were induced to
do some planting along the Santa Lucia, a tributary of the
Gila river. Collins recommended that a permanent reservation be laid out on the same site, a proposal that found a
ready reception in Washington. As a result, in 1860, a
reservation was authorized "commencing at Santa Lucia
Springs and running north 15 miles; thence west 15 miles;
thence south 15 miles; thence east 15 miles to the place of
beginning." 6
The reservation sit,e had several advantages from the
point of view of Collins: the Gila country was sufficiently
far from settlements to avoid contact between the Indians
and whites; and it lay on a north and south line with Fort
Defiance and the proposed Ute reservation on the San Juan,
so that a military patrol during the summer between the
three points would serve to keep the Indians quiet and make
unnecessary any more campaigns against them. He also believed that a military post nearby was necessary for the success of the plan. In this need he received the cooperation
of the military; Colonel Bonneville located a company of soldiers southeast of the Burro Mountains, about eight to ten
5. Sylvester Mowry to Denver, 1/7/5S', and S. Hart to Mowry, 12/20/58, M551-59.
S. Wait to Mowry, 12/17/58, M550/59.
The Mimbreno chief was "called Mangas Colorado (Red Sleeves), from a fashion
he had adopted of wearing his arms painted with the blood of his victims." Mrs.
F. E. Victor, "On the Mexican Border," in Overland Monthly, VI, 464 (May, 1871).
See aso John C. Cremony, "Some Savages," Ibid., XIII, 202 (March, 1872).
6. Kapper, I, 873. Collins to Mix, 12/5/58, CI903/59. Greenwood to Joseph S.
Wilson, 5/14/60, LB 63, p. 354. Steck, Annual Report, 8/12/59, 36 Congo 1 Bess.
Sen. Ex. Doc. 2, I, 712ff (1023).
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miles north of the Overland Mail route. Unfortunately for
everyone concerned these plans went astray because of the
Civil War,7 although they might not have been realized even
otherwise.
In the late fall of 1860, trouble broke out between the
miners at Pinos Altos and the Apaches hanging around
there. The miners accused the Indians of stealing horses, a
charge that mayor may not have been true because there
were characters on the frontier other than Indi~ns who
.were not above stealing stock; nevertheless, they took summary action. Major Lynde sent a force of troops from Fort
Floyd to free some Apaches taken prisoners by the miners.
and the officials hoped that the Indians could be made to see
the difference between acts of the government and unauthorized acts of individuals. 8 This hope was hardly justifiable
because the behavior of the government men themselves was
not always above criticism. .
On another occasion, in April, 1861, the military captured the Apache chief Cochise by treachery, in their attempt to punish those guilty of stealing a cow and a child.
The chief escaped by ~utting a. hole through the tent in
which he was confined and "made Arizona and New Mexico
-at least the southern half of them- ... about the liveliest place on God's footstool.
"The account, if put down by a Treasury expert, would·
read something like this:
Dr.
The United States to Cochise,
For one brother, killed "while resisting arrest."
Cr.
By ten thousand (10,000) men, women, and children killed, wounded, or tortured to death, scared
out of their senses or driven out of the country,
their wagon and pack-trains run off and destroyed,

----

7. Collins to Mix. 12/5/58. C1903/59. Bonneville to Thomas, 7/15/59. 36 Congo
1 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 2. I:I. 306 (l024).
8. Maj. J. Lynde to Steck. 12/14/60. and Steck to Collins, 12/14/60. C902/61.
P. R. Tully to Collins, 1/3/61. C910/61.
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ranchos ruined, ilnd all industrial development
stopped. 9

With the outbreak of Indian hostilities, accelerated by
the Civil War, the mining area around Pinos Altos and the
farming area in the Mimbres valley were practically abandoned and the country surrendered to the savages temporarily. The troops were withdrawn in the spring of 1861.
Lorenzo Labadi, who had been appointed agent at Tucson,
then under the jurisdiction of Collins, was discouraged from
assuming his duties by the threat of being tarred and
feathered by southern sympathizers. He was recalled in
June and the following month Steck acknowledged that
there was no need for an agent in southwestern New Mexico because nothing could be done for the time being. A
few miners lingered on into the fall, hoping for aid from the
Confederate authorities. but resumption of the task of subduing the Apache and placing them on a reservation was
to await the action of Carleton two years later. 1o
The new departmental commander sent an expedition
against the Indians in January, 1863, and established Fort
West on the Gila river. The results were pleasing to the
military because the famous chief Mangas Colorado was
disposed of while attempting to escape from his captors
at Fort McLane.H
9. John G. Bourke, On the Border with Croolc, p. 120. Raphael Pumpelly, "A
Mining Adventure in New Mexico: A real experience," in Putnam's Magazine. IV,
495 New Series (Oct., 1869). Frank C. Lockwood, Pioneer DaYB in Arizona, pp. 160163.
10. Tully to Collins, 6/2/61, C1231/61. Labadi to Collins, 6/16/61, C1244/61.
Steck to Collins, 7/15/61, C1286/61. Wm. Markt to commander-in-chief confederate troops in Ariz. Terr., 10/8/61, R. R., Ser. I, vol. IV, 120. Collins, Annual Report,
10/8/61, 37 Congo 2 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, I, 732-33 (1117) .
11. General Orders No 3, 2/24/64, R. R., Ser. I, XV, 227. The escape was probably planned by the military to afford an excuse for killing Mangas. See Steck to
Dole, 2/15/65, S606/65; S. W. Cozzens, The MarvellouB Country, p. 526; Lockwood
PioneeT DaYB, p. 157-60.
"His name was a tocsin of terror throughout northern Mexico, Arizona, and
New Mexico; and, to this day, the people shudder when they hear the name of
Mangas Colorado."
"There is no exaggeration in affirming, that his hands have been reddened in the
gore of hundreds of victims/' erernany, "Some Savages," in Overland MlYfI,thly. VIII,
202-203 (March, 1872).
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Furthermore, their hearts rejoiced because
The evidences of rich gold fields and of silver and
of inexhautstible mines of the richest copper in the
country at the head of the Mimbres River and
along the country drained by the Upper Gila are of
an undoubted character. It seems providential
that the practical miners of California should have
come here to assist in their discovery and development. 12
In his enthusiasm for gold, Carleton visualized another
El Dorado comparable to the gold fields of California. He
assured interested parties in the East. that Fort West
would be a permanent post to provide protection for miners;
unless, of course, the Confederates successfully invaded
New Mexico. knugget of gold was forwarded to Washington for President Lincoln; "It will gratify him to know that
Providence is blessing our country, even though it chasteneth." 13 But in order to realize to the full the blessing of
Providence more troops were needed. To this end an urgent
appeal was made to General Halleck for aid. He was sympathetic and "fully aware of the importance of exploring
and opening up for mining and settlement that vast region
of country that separates the Mfssissippi Valley from the
Pacific States.. But at the present we have not the means of
. doing this." 14 However, he did authorize the enrollment of
volunteers within reasonable limits for the undertaking. 14
A year later, after the main thrust at the Navaho had
been completed, a simultaneous movement against the Gih
bands was ordered for May 25, 1864. Detachments were
detailed to operate from the several army posts dotting
western and southwestern New' Mexico and southern Arizona, from Fort Wingate to Tucson, and another fort, Good12. Carleton to Thomas, 2/1/63, R. R., Ser. I, XV, 670.
13. C:"rleton to Chase, 9/20/63, S. J. C., 1667, p. 140. Samuel J. Jones to Carleton, 3/18/63, A. G. 0., LR, S8/65. Carleton to Jones, 4/27/63, S. J. C., 1867, p. 109.
The General's imagination was not .restrained by an international boundary.
There was gold too in Mexico "which states the French want, and which we should
never permit them to have," Carleton to Thomas, 8/1/63, S. J. C., 1867, p. 121.
14. Halleck to Carleton, 9/8'/63, R. R., Ser. I, Pt. I, vol. 26, p. 720. Carleton
to Halleck, 5/10/63, R. R., Ser. I, vol. 15 p. 723.
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win, was planned for the banks of the Gila. The usual
Carleton instructions were issued: the Apache must surrender or be killed. 15
Insofar as subduing these savages was concerned, the
campaign was a failure. The soldiers were not able to round
up the elusive enemy who displayed their boldness, and even
contempt for the soldiers, by venturing to the very picket
ropes of Fort Goodwin. 16 One party of seven was captured
at Zuni while trading for powder and lead and were sent to
the Bosque Redondo,17 where Carleton planned to locate
all of them, but that was a meagre success in view of the
elaborate plans made.
Friction between Carleton and Steck over the policy of
managing Inq,ians of course extended to the Gila. A report
came to Steck in February, 1865, that Victorio and Salvador
(son of Mangas Colorado) visited Pinos Altos and expressed a desire for peace; furthermore, they preferred not
to deal with the military because of distrust engendered by
past experiences. Steck was in sympathy both with their desire for peace and their distrust of the army officers "as they
have suffered from their treachery."18 He accordingly made
plans to visit them on the Gila and requested a military escort from Fort Craig to Fort West or to the Mimbres if the
interview was held there. Carleton flatly declined to cooperate. The Apache, according to his view, were in charge
of the military until at peace and they must surrender and
go to the Bosque Redondo or be exterminated. 19 This impasse was followed by four years of Indian attacks on the
unwary traveler, settlements, and military posts, and intermittent scouts by soldiers through the hills trying to catch
the hostiles. On the whole, the Indians had the better of the
struggle. They even ran off the cavalry horses at least twice,
15. General Orders No. 12. 5/1/64, R. R., Ser. I, pt. 8, XXXIV, 887-89.
16. X. Y. Z. to Editors, 9/9/64. in The New Mexican, 9/28/64.
This boldness, of course, was in keeping with the known ability of the Indian
disguise himself and even penetrate inside an army post without detection.
17. The New Mexican. 9/16/64.

18. Steck to Mix, 8/12/65 and petition from Mesilla, 2/10/65, S624/65.
19, Steck to Carleton, 8/15/65, and Carleton to Stec" 8/16/65, S625/65.
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much to the irritation of Carleton.2o The mail carriers between Mesilla and Tucson, to Pinos Altos, and occasionally
while crossing the Jornada del Muerto, ventured on their
trips at the risk of their lives. Pinos Altos was favored with
a raid in March, 1869, and Tularosa in April of the same
year. 21 The killing of individuals and stealing stock in small
numbers were almost too frequent to record. On
April 2, [1869 J the Indians killed and stripped a
Mexican close to this town [Pinos Altos], while
coming from the post; about the same time they
stole forty goats from Vicente Lobato, one horse
of Judge Houston, one horse and one burro of
Carlos Navarro, and two burros of Wm. Grant, all
of Pinos Altos.
On the 26th they killed a· man at the Santa
Rita copper mines, and chased a hunter into Mr.
Vendlandt's cabin at San Jose.
On the 30th they killed, stripped and scalped two
miners in the Arroyo de Santo Domingo, about one
one mile and a half from town; stole one horse
from Mr. Emil Markt, fifteen head of cattle from
Mr. Bremen, and about the same amount from Mr.
Patterson, beef contractor at Fort Baya!. .:\
Why does not our government raise volunteers, and like the Mexican government pay $100
per scalp. Here in Don Ana and Grant county
could be raised at least three hundred men, who in
a short time would suppress all these cruelties. If
something is not Eoon done Pinos Altos will be
"played out."22
20. Col. Francisco P. Abreu to Maj. C. H. De Forrest,. 5/4/66, A196/66. Carleton to Capt. Geo. A. Burkett, 6/22/66, C340/66;
21. The Daily New Mexican, 3/31/69 and 5/3/69.
. 22. Citizen to Editors, 5/7/69, The Daily New Mexican, 5/17/69.
UBut little notice is taken now~a~day~ of the record of 4Indian Depredations,'
unless we happen to be the sufferers ourselves. So often are these outrages laid
before the public through newspapers, that they have come to be regarded as an
'old song,', and no attention is paid them; it is not easy to say how this unhealthy
state of affairs is to be changed, and the government aroused to a proper sense of its
responsibility. Certain it is that while we remain inactive, or at most stand in the
defensive, the Indians continue to sap the very foundations of every branch of
industry and enterprise in the Territory. The people. have patiently waited for years
with the confident hope that the government would take measures to put a stop to
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Meanwhile, the military had been trying to do some'thing about the matter. Fort Selden was established at the
.southern end of the Jornada del Muerto, in the spring of
1865, for the protection of the Mesilla valley, and in the
fall of 1866, Fort Bayard was located near Silver City for
the protection of the miners in that neighborhood. Carleton believed that the seekers for gold would persist in venturing into Indian ocnntry and that they ought to be protected so that the mineral wealth could be exploited for the
general benefit of the country.23 Although these measures
did not end the depredations, they did encourage the return
of the miners. 24
The efforts of the army to control the Apache was seconded.by the territorial officials. Under a law of 1857 authorizing the loan of public arms, the acting governor recommended,November 20, 1866, that volunteer companies be
formed for home protection. And in 1869, when the Indian
depredations were raising a greater storm of public protest
than usual, the probate judges were authorized to organize
23. "General Carleton, Colonel Davis, Colonel Enos and other officers have
mining interests in that section [Fort Bayard] of the country, but I do not believe,
that those officers have made use of their official positions, in any way, to protect
specially, those interests." Getty to A. A. A .. 10/6/67, A. G. 0., LS 43, p. 323.
24. Norton, 8/24/67, in C. L A., Annual Report, 1867, p. 193.
"The news of the soldiery coming to this rich mining country was drawing
miners and adventurers from far and near. and Pinos Altos promised to become a
mining district once more."
Josephine Clifford, uAn Officer's Wife in New Mexico,"
in Overland Monthly, IV, 152 (Feb. 1870). Mrs. Clifford arrived at Fort Bayard late
in August, 1866.
the existing state of affairs, but each year reveals increasing outrages by the Indians
and neglect from the government.

*

UThere are barely sufficient troops in the Territory to garrison the posts, and
it is in the immediate vicinity of these posts that most of the depredations are committed . . . . On the 17th ultimo the Indians came into Fort 'Bayard and drove off a
herd of beef cattle belonging to the beef contractor . . . . The gallant raiders triumphantly ascended the summit of Burro Mountain, where they halted for a few days,
killed and jerked the beef, had a grand baile, and then went on their way rejoicing.

*

*

*

"Pinos Altos, once a flourishing mining district, . . . is now fast deserted
by the hardy miners because of the annoyance of the ubiquitous Apache . . . In the
part of the country to which I allude, the semblance of protection received from the
government is only a farce and a mockery."
Jornada to. Editors, June 5, 1869, The Daily New Mexican, 6/14/69.
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mounted posses of ten to twenty-five men in each precinct.
They were instructed to proceed only against marauders
and not to molest Indians that were living at peace. 25 Several posses were organized under this procedure,26 but they
could accomplish little more than civilian retaliatory expeditions had been able to do in past years.
In the midst of these attempts to subdue the Gila, the
Carleton plan of concentrating all Apaches at the Bosque
Redondo lost favor. The Indians were difficult to capture
and sufficient troops for a definitive campaign had never
been provided to make .the policy a success. The proposal
for a separate reservation for the Gila was revived, sponsored by Superintendent Norton and supported by the
people in the Silver City area. 27 Such a plan was also apparently acceptable to the Indians. Some of them expressed a
desire for peace in 1867 on the basis of a separate reservation, and in 1869 the Mimbreiio band made known their
desire to the commander at Fort McRae to camp on the west
side of the Rio Grande across from the post,28 a location that
was in the region where they desired to have a reservation.
.When the military superseded the civil officials in the
Indian service in 1869, LieutenantChas. E. Drew was assigned to the Gila in July witb, instructions to prepare them
for a change into a civilized I'form of existence. The ne.v
agent pursued his new task energetically and found truth in
the above reports that the Indian wanted a reservation.
The Mimbreiios, under chief Loco, wanted to plant at Cuchio·
(Cuchillo Negro), an old haunt, to hunt along the east side
of the Mimbres mountains south to Fort Thorn, eastward
of the Rio Grande to Sierra del Caballos, and twenty miles
north from Fort McRae. Drew believed strongly that the
peace policy would succeed, but prompt measures to relieve
25. New Mexico, Executive Record, 1851-1867, p. 417. Clinton to Parker, 8/26/69,
C436/69.
.
26. The Daily New Mexican, 9/11/69, 9/25/69, 11/23/69.· .
27. Letters to Manderfield and Tucker from Mimbres, 8/11/66, and Pinos Altos,
8/15/66, N105/66.
28. A. H. Hackney to Colonel (?), 1/31/67, H81/67. O. Grover to A. A. G.,
6/2/69, G149/69. Getty to superintendent, 7/3/69, G167/69.
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their distress were necessary. The need for funds then was
urgent; but as usual the supplies were insufficient, although
a small amount of food was provided for his new charges.29
Drew held another meeting with the Apache on October
10 near the town of Canada Alamosa, about twenty-five
miles northwest of Fort McRae. In addition to Loco, Chiefs
Victorio, Lopez, and Chastine were present with their followers. The new comers came well prepared for trouble and
would not tolerate the presence of soldiers. Recognizing the
critical nature of the situation, Drew made every effort to
allay their fears. A citizen posse under Captain Bullard
was persuaded to leave town, and a request was sent to the
several army posts not to send any scouting parties to disturb them. But aside from making promises, the agent was
in no position to furnish the Indians with adequate supplies
for the usual reason. 30
The new peace policy did not meet with an entirely favorable reception on the frontier. A decade of depredations
was a long record for the Indians to remove from the public
mind before their peaceful intentions would be accepted at
full value. Consequently, when some of the hostiles committed further outrages, the Indians assembled at Canada Alamosa were viewed with suspicion and even accused of the
crime. In November this feeling broke out into an open
dispute when W.' L. R~rnerson wrote a strong letter to Governor Pile stating that the Mimbrefios had left their camp
and requesting additional troops to operate against hostiles
in genera1. 31 Drew replied to the charge with the accusation that
From information received from reliable sources,
I am compelled to believe, that a party in the lower
country is strongly opposed to any attempt to make
peace with the Apaches, and especially to the placing of them on a reservation-No doubt they have
their own reason for their conduct. 32
Parker to Drew, 7/6/69, LB 90, p. 537. Parker to Clinton, 7/16/69, LB 91,
Drew to Parker, 9/3/69, C481/69.
30. Drew to Clinton, Report, 10/11/69, C612/69.
31. 11/22/69, C801/69.
32. Drew to Clinton, 12/12/69, C801/69.
29.

p. 79.
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. Rynerson was post trader at Fort Bayard and additional
troops, of course, would improve his business, but the temper of the times in New Mexico partly favore.d the continued
use of the army in controlling the Apache. Drew, however,
was doubtless sincere and maybe right when he absolved his
immediate charges of any wrong doing since contacting
them.
Resolutions were forwarded by citizens of Mesilla,
Mimbres, and Pinos Altos, in support of Rynerson and condemnation of the peace policy, particularly when it consisted
apparently of collecting Indians on a reservation safe from.
pursuit for wrong-doing and without troops to prevent them
from depredating. The inhabitants of several small settlements near the proposed reservation counter~d with resolutions in support of Drew and the peace policy.33 The controversy carried on into the spring of 1870. With the miners
"Up here, in the hill country, there is no two sides to the
Indian question";S4 meaning, of course, that Drew's Indians
were depredating and that force was the proper solution to
the problem. Residents of Paraje were equally confirmed in
the belief that their stock had' not suffered from the misdoings of the Canada Alamosa· Indians, and the agent was
of the opinioJ;l, that thefts committed by whites were often
unjustly attributed to his charges. 35
Despite some depredations in the spring, whether by
the Indians at Canada Alamosa or not, there was a decided
decline in the activities of the hostiles. 36 But such a luli
decided nothing definitely. The frontier was divided in
opinion about the peace policy, a state of mind that con·stituted a serious threat to its success. As Ni~rod posed the
question:
33. The Daily New Mexican, 1/29/60, 3/1/70, 3/9/70.
34. Miner to Manderfield & Tucker, 2/25/70, in The Daily New Mexican, 3/18/70.
Rynerson to Editors, 1/2/70, Ibid., 1/4/70.
35. Drew to .Clinton, 1/5/70, C840/70. Resolutions from Paraje, 4/28/70, in
The Daily New Mexican, 5/10/70.
. 36. Pile to Probate Judges, 5/26/70, C13G3/70. Rynerson to R. M. Stephens,
in The D.aily New Mexican, 6/18/70.

6/6/70,
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Were you to see a choir of heavenly breech clouts
approaching, preceded by a flag of truce on a ramrod, singing, sweetly in tune, from "Drew's Sacred
Harmony:"
Ye boundless realms of joy,
Exalts our Vincent's fame;
His praise your song employ,
Above the starry frame.

*

*

*

would you shoot, or halt your wagon and invite
them to a potluck, ... ?
The questioner rather guessed "I'd shoot, or,
if I had a poor team I'd stop and grub 'em, . . .
and when they had licked the platter, I'd shake
hands all round and go, without apparent fear of
injuring the jack wax of the neck by too frequent
or sudden retrospection over the shoulder in the
direction of the Vincent Brothers." 37
The sincerity of the opposition to the Canada Alamosa
project was more open to suspicion in that it finally developed into a personal attack on the agent. He was' accused
of habitual intemperance by Rynerson and residents of
Dona Ana County, a charge that was brought formally before the superintendent in May by Messrs. Jeffords and
Brevoort, traders who had had their licenses revoked by
Drew. The tribulations of the agent, however, were soon
to an end. He died on June 5 from exposure, having lost
his way in the mountains when in pursuit of some depredating Mescaleros. A. G, Hennlsee was immediately detailed to
take his place. 3s
The tenure of the new agent was brief, but in the few
months that he was on duty at Canada Alamosa, he found
that his job was not a bed of roses. The funds continued to
be. woefully inadequate for providing the Indians with
a living and they doubtless now did occasionally purloin a
beef from their neighbors. In February, the superinten37. Nimrod, 3/22/70, in The Daily New Mexican, 4/4/70.
38. Rynerson to Chaves, 2/26/70, C1209/70. Jeffords and Brevoort to Clinton,
5/12/70. C1328/70. H~ D. Hall to Clinton. 6/5/70, C1392/70.
See also 091/70.

THE FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY

293

dent had· purchased 300 Mexican blankets for the practically
naked Indians without permission from Washington, and
allotted $2,500 for their subsistence. This was supplemented by supplies advanced by the post commander at Fort
Craig.
Other complications arose from the tendency of the
Indians to make whiskey when whole corn was issued, and
the practice indulged in by the settlers of selling them liquor
and sometimes ammunition. Hennisee, in an attempt to
break up this practice, came to blows with the local officials,
at Canada Alamosa. He was put on trial for assault and in
turn secured the indictment of the justice of the peace and
the constable before the United States commissioner at
Albuquerque. Civil action had been resorted to in fear that
the summoning of soldiers would excite the Indians and
cause them to decamp for the mountains. 39 This troublesome situation was passed on to Hennisee's successor,
Orland F. Piper, who, sponsored by the Presbyterian Board
of Foreign Missions, was appointed to that agency in
November, 1870.
Meanwhile, one cheering event had occurred. The elusive chief Cochise, whose hatred of the whites dated back
for a decade, from the days of his treacherous arrest and
the murder of Mangas Colorado, visited Canada Alamosa
briefly and evinced a desire for peace. This was considered
a golden opportuninty for pushing the project of a permanent reservation with adequate support for the Indians, but
the usual lack of funds prevented decisive action. 40 With the
office of Indian affairs in no financial condition to meet the
emergency; Coly.er appealed to the war department for aid·
until a congressional appropriation was available. In the
absence of the secretary, the necessary order to that end was
signed by President Grant. Then the discouraging information was forwarded from New Mexico that there was no
39. Clinton to Drew, 10/6/69, A687/70. Clinton to Parker, 2/5/70, C907/70.
Hennisee to Clinton, 6/22/79, C1437/70. Hennisee to Clinton, 9/16/70, C1730/70.
. 40. Hennisee to Clinton, 10/22/70, C1866/70. Pope to Parker, 12/7/70, P576/70,
and P592/70.
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siirplus of beef and COrn in the district to supply the Indians ;41 however, that was a defect that could be remedied.
In the spring and summer of 1871, local feeling against
the Gila Apache again rose to fever heat.
"It would seem that the government ought to inaugurate more vigerous means of dealing with
these wretches than feeding them good beef &
bacon on the reservation," one complainant wrote.
"Milk & water, kid glove policies may do for some
tribes but its no go with the Apaches." 42
Governor Pile favored the peace policy in principle, but
aware of the public attitude, he thre'atenedto take action if
the government did not soon accomplish something more
tangible than had yet been doile. The local federal' men
were doing all that they could; there were over 1,000
Apache assembled at Canada Alamosa and Superintendent
Pope had been doing his best to keep them contented, a particularly difficult task in the face of two years of promises
of a permanent reservation and insufficient rations. In addition to some aid from the military and the meager funds
allotted by the Indian bureau, he had incurred art indebtedness of $9,000 in the interest of these Indians. The increase
in depredations he attributed to the aggressions of scouting
parties of soldiers and citizens. But his teiegram to Washington that "The condition of affairs in southern New Mexico demand immediate action,"43 couid have applied at almost
any time duririg the past ten years.,
P"iper visited his charges early in March, 1871, and
found them much excited over reports that scouting parties
were coming their way. He attempted to allay their fear,,,
and remained confident that "If these Indians are not tampered with by men that would like to make trouble, and they
are furnished with sufficient food, I think there is no danger
of them leaving the reservation. I am confident that they
41. Colyer to Townsend, 12/23/70, A1598/70. Townsend to Colyer, 12/29/70.
A5/71. J. P. Clum to Colyer, 12/21/70; LB 97, p. 541, B. 1. C., Report, 1870, p. 102.
42. Ec W. Peet to Benjamin F. Butler, 3/12/71, P167/71.
43. Pope to Parker, 3/18/71, P149/71. Pile to Pope, 3/18/71, P154/71.
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desire peace."44 The superintendent supplemented the efforts
of his agent by paying a visit to Caiillda Alamosa in April.
He promised food and protection for all who came into the
camp, but believed it inadvisable to. raise the subject of a
permanent reservation until such time as Cochise had been
rounded up with his followers. 45
But since all the Indians were not coop.erating in forwarding peace there was always the possibility that an
armed party would invade the reservation. Some stolen
stock was actually traced to Canada Alamosa in July. This,
on top of numerous killings up to that time, led the citizens
of Mimbres to organize a posse or at least threaten to do
so and recover the stolen stock wherever it be found, even at
the sacrifice of every Indian "man, woman and child in the
tribe." And if any agents, traders, or soldiers intervened,
they would be treated as common enemies of New Mexico !46
This belligerent manifesto was forwarded to the superintendent by Richard Hudson of Pinos Altos, who wanted to
know whether the stock could be recovered peacefully
or if we are to be forever at the mercy of these
thieving, murderous Apaches, who have a "House
of Refuge" at Alamosa ..., because the citizens of
this county are determined to put a stop to it, and
if they carry out their programme the Camp Grant
massacre will be thrown entirely iIi the shade and
Alamosa will rank next to "Sand Creek,"47
In answer to the threats of the aroused citizens, Agent
Piper advised patience and forbearance. The superintendent
then instructed him to restore any stolen stock found among
the Indians and to apprehend the guilty ones or drive them
away from this refuge so that they could be subject to
punitive action by the armed forces. But lest the innocent
suffer with the guilty, the military was requested to keep at
44. Piper to Editors, 3/11/71, Weelely New Mexican, 3/2/71.
45. Pope to Parker, 4/21/71, P224/71.
46. Mimbres resolutions, 7/19/71, C542/71. Hiawatha to Editors, 7/16/71, The
Da.uy New Mexican, 7/29/71. Pile to Fish, 4/27/81, A298/71.
47. Hudson to Piper, 7/18/71, C542/71.
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least one company in readiness to protect the Indians who
remained on the reservation. 48 The efforts to meet this
crisis had been seconded by President Grant with the suggestion that additional powers be given either to Superintendent Pope or Colyer for that purpose. 49
Colyer had been directed in May, 1871, by the board of
Indian commissioners, to proceed to New Mexico and Arizona and carry out the general policy that had been laid
down by the government in 1869; namely,
That they (the Indians) should be· secured in
their legal rights; located when practicable on reservations; assisted in agricultural pursuits and the
arts of civilized life; and that Indians who should
fail or refuse to come in and locate in permanent
abodes provided for them would be subject wholly
to the control and supervision of military authorities, to be treated as friendly or hostile as circumstances might justify~
Congress made available, as of July 1, the sum of $70,000 to
finance the cost of this undertaking. 50 In keeping with the
suggestion of the president, Colyer was invested with full
discretionary powers by the secretary of the interior to
carry out the plan. 51
He arrived in New Mexico in August and journeyed
immediately to Canada Alamosa, where he found to his disappointment that the Indians had been frightened away by
the residents of Mimbres despite the order for troops from
Fort McRae to afford protection. But undiscouraged, Colyer
proceeded with the main business in hand, that of a permanent .location for a reservation, with the feeling that the
run-a~ways would return when conditions were more satisfactory. Canada Alamosa was considered unsuitable and a
site was picked out ten miles on each side of the Tularosa
river and its tributaries for a distance of thirty miles from
48. See correspondence in 0542/71.
49. Grant to Delano, 7/13/71, 1603/71.
50. B. I. C., Report, 1871, p. 5-6.
51. Secretary of interior to ColYer, 7/21/71, in O. 1. A., Annual Report, 1871,
p. 77. Townsend to general, department of Missouri, 7/18/71, A453/71.
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their origin in the Datil mountains and allied ranges of
southwestern New Mexico. The location was remote from
the settlements, surrounded by mountains not easily crossed,
with sufficient arable land, water, wood, and game. Agent
Piper was instructed to collect his charges there as soon as
possible and the military were ordered to provide protection. 52
Prospects for success with the new venture were brightened when the arch evil among the Gila, the famous Cochise,
joined his brethren at Canada Alamosa on September 28.
"He rode up to the offi~e of the agency, dismounted, and
walked in with marked dignity, and the bearing of a man of
great force of character."o3 This auspicious event was the
result of negotiations begun in the spring of 1871 when
messengers had been sent to get in contact with him. Cochise
was on a raiding expedition into Mexico at the time, but the
Indians in his camp near the Arizona boundary line, "nearly
naked, half starved, and in constant fear of scouting parties
of troops," were induced to come to Canada Alamosa except
C0chise's family, who agreed to come in with the chief when
h~) returned. His acceptance of the urgent invitation
extended by the government to res!de on the New Mexico
side of the boundary line was no doubt influenced by the
activity of Crook in Arizona and the governments of the
northern Mexican states. 54
,
With the presence of three important chiefs and their
followers, Cochise, Loco, and Victorio, at Canada Alamosa,
and presidential approval of the new reservation, the next
problem, and a difficult one, was the removal of the Indians.
Agent Piper reported that "They positively refuse to go;
52. Colyer to Delano. 8/22/71. C570/70. Colyer to Pope. 8/29/71. A575/71.
"We regret to learn that that old philanthropic humbug. Vincent Colyer. is about
to inflict another visit upon our unfortunate Territory." The Daily New Mexican,
7/27/71. But see Peace. to Editors. 8/24/71. Ibid.. 8/30/71. for a more favorable
attitude.
53. San Jose to editors. 9/28/71. The Daily New Mexican. 10/5/71. Pope to
Parker. 10/7/71. P477 1/2-71.
54. Piper to Col. Davis. 9/30/71. A629/71. Pope to Parker. 4/21/71. P213/71.
Pope to Parker. 5/24/71, P275/71. Pope to Parker. 6/28/71. P319/71.
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saying that I may take the rations and give them to the
Bears and Wolves, that they will do without."55 Conse'quently, he recommended that they be permitted to remain
where they were and a great saving to the government
would be effected. This easy tolerance of the Indians'
objection was not shared by the superintendent. He suspected that the settlers at Canada Alamosa favored· the
retention of their neighbors for the sake of profits from
trade. But the best that Pope could propose was to move
the agency and trust to various factors, such as hunger
when rations were ended at Canada Alamosa; the approach'ing whiter, and the troops on the move in Arizona, that the
Indians would follow their agent. It was a critical situation
because a display of force to effect the removal might cause
a large part of the savages t() scatter like scared jackrabbits.
A temporary policy of leniency was finally decided upon
with the approval of President Grant and the removal was
postponed until spring, but on the understanding that "they
must prepare to move as soon as possible to 'Tularosa' or
some other locality that may hereafter be selected for their
occupation. 56
When spring arrived the project of removal waR again
taken in hand. Pope held a conference with the Indians on
March 19 and fixed May 1 as the day of departure. He was
still convinced that the long delay had been due primarily to
the machinations of the settlers and reservation hangers-on
and was determined to push the matter to a conclusion
regardless of the consequences. Those who were willing
to go would be provided for, the rest would be left to the
military fqr summary action. 57
Matters did not proceed exactly as planned, but the
officials were finally rewarded for their patience and persistence. The agency was removed to the new site at the
55. Piper to Pope, 10/20/71, P521/71.
56. Clum to Pope, 11/8/71, LB 103, p. 266. Pope to commissioner, 10/17/71,
P501/71. Piper to Pope, 10/20/71; Pope to commissioner, 10/26/71; and Delano to
Clum, 11/20/71, 1997/71. Delano to Clum, 11/7/71, 1969/71.
57. Pope to Walker, 3/23/72, P766/72; 4/29/72, P819/72; and 5/9/72, P340/72.
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end of April and two companies of soldiers were stationed
there as garrison for the new Fort Tularosa. The superintendent was disgusted at the obstinacy of. the Indians in riot
following immediately, but the deadline for action on their
part was moved up to June 1 and the military refrained
from sending out scouting parties for the time being. 58 This
wise decision brought its reward. A report was received at
Fort Craig on May 12 that a band of the Indians were on the
north end of the Canada Alamosa location in a mood to
move and awaiting transportation of Indians. 59
Devine and Pope arrived at Tularosa on the 19th with six
wagon loads of the mor.efeeble women and children. The
rest of the followers of Victorio; Loco, and Chica, a sub-chief
in Cochise's band, took a more mountainous route and
arrived later with the balance of the women and children
who had refused the invitation to ride. But the suspicious
Cochise, whose sojourn on the reservation had again been
brief, held aloof, watching the proceedings froIp his haunts
in the mountains. It was planned to let him alone for a
while, merely sending out scouting parties and runers to
warn all Indians to come iiI. 60 And there were yet many
loose in the hills. Of the maximum number of about 1,900
that had assembled at Canada Alamosa at one time or
another, only about 500 favored the new location with their
presence. 61
The reluctance of Cochise to accept a home on the new
reservation was still a serious factor in the success of the
plan. When General O. O. Howard came to the southwest in
the summer of 1872 as a special representative to bring
peace to the country, he visited the chieftain in. his stronghold in the Dragoon mountains, October 1. The upshot of
this meeting was an agreement whereby he and his band
would be permitted to settle on a reservation, the Chiri58. Piper to Pope, 4/30/72, P3/72. Devine to A. A. A. G., 5/9/72, WI629/72.
59. Devine to A. A. A. G., 5/13/72, WI629/72.
60. Pipe to Wal~r, 5/19/72, P850/72; and 6/5/72, P890/72.
61. Piper to Pope, 10/24/71, P357/71. Nemo to Editors, 6/15/72, The Dauy
Ne1v Mexican, 7/3/72. Ibid., 10/3/72. See also W596/72.
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cahua, in the southeastern corner of Arizona. There the
old warrior spent his last years in peace, dying on June 8,
1874. 63 His troubled existence had come to an end, but the
same could not be said for his people.
Although settling the affairs of the Cochise band for the
time being, Howard had not been an entirely happy influence on the course of events at Tularosa. Quickly aware
of the reluctance of the Indians to leave Canada Alamosa,
he had unwisely promised them that they could return if
Cochise would locate there, a promise of course which could
not be fulfilIed. 64 He also issued passes to a small band, from
whom he had drawn his guides for the trip to the Dragoon
mountains, to visit Canada Alamosa for hunting. These
visitors to the old reservation were soon accused of stealing
and the superintendent took steps to end the temporary
military inactivity sponsored by Howard and return to the
policy of driving the Indians back to the reservation.
But Canada Alamosa remained a strong attraction for
the Indians at Tularosa and there was an intermittent complaint about not being permitted to return. The ostensible
reason was the lack of farming land at Tularosa to provide
the customary fruits and vegetables obtainable in the old
location. Superintendent Dudley on a visit to the reservation
in March, 1873, attributed the discontent to the lenient
policy of the agent, John Ayers, whom he accused of encouraging the idea of a return as a means of preserving peace
among them. But when a letter from General Howard was
read to them in council, stating that the refusal of Cochise
to return made impossible the reoccupation of Canada Alamosa, and the distribution of a few presents and a promise
to prove the fertility of the lands at Tularosa were made,
the feeling of discontent was temporarily allayed. Victorio
62. Howard to commanding officer at Fort Lowell, 10/2/72, W543/72. Howard
to Walker, 10/15/72, H319/72.
Vincent Colyer resigned in February, 1872.
63. Dudley to Smith, 6/30/74, in C.!. A., Annual Report, 1874, p. 301-302.
64. Granger to A. A. G., 9/29/72, W436/72. Howard to Coleman, 2/7/73,
D378/73.
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was then given a pass to bring back 100 young men on their
way to raid Mexico. But despite these measures, the desire
of the Indians for the former location was ultimately to be
realized,05 though only temporarily.
Perhaps both Piper and Ayers had leaned too heavily on
the side of leniency, but the adoption of a sterner attitude
.with the arrival of Agent Benjamin M. Thomas did not
mend matters. In the summer of 1873, a brush occurred between a scouting party from Fort Selden and a small group
of Indians near Canada Alamosa under the leadership of
one of their more notorious thieves. Pursuant to the statements made by the chiefs in the past that their bad men
should be punished, Thomas requested Major Price to arrest
the troublemakers. When the military attempted to apprehend them at Tularosa, where they had returned, the Indians
in general refused to countenance such action and fled to the
hills, except for thirty-five that were captured. The military
were then faced with the task of either coaxing or driving
them back.° o
This demonstration of force to control the Indians was
a reaction from the idealism of Colyer. Both Thomas and
Price were in accord that a firm policy was necessary. As
Price wrote,
I believe and know that the most humane
policy to pursue both toward the Indians and the
scattering population of a new country, is to never
overlook or compromise a depredation committed
by the Indians against the defenceless and scattered white settlers, not to allow citizens to vent
their vengeance against innocent or inoffensive
Indians on a reservation and supposed to be under
65. Dudley to commissioner, 3/15/73, and Howard to Coleman, 2/7/73, D378/73.
Stapleton to Dudley. 3/1/73, D370/73.
John Ayers succeeded Piper temporarily in September, 1872. Benjamin M.
Thomas was given the perm~nent appointment in November.
66. Capt. Geo. W. Chilson to Price, 7/17/73, and Price to A. A. A. G., 7/25/73,
W1013/73. Thomas to Dudley, 7/25/73, D417/73.
.
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the protection of the Military Authol-ities of the
United States. 67

Th~re was certainly justification for a belief in the wisdom of a strict policy of management because the handling
of the Gila was a task that would tax the patience of a Job
and the wisdom of a Solomon. Getting drunk on tizwin,
which they made from corn, was a common occurrence, and
the presence of soldiers with access to a supply of whiskey at
the trader's post made liquor a source of trouble from
both sides. The inability of some of the Indians to -refrain
fr.om stealing stock was just as marked as ever. Whereas
.at Canada Alamosa the fruits of their stealing could be
traded to unscrupulous whites, at Tularosa the Navaho from
the north were glad to exchange blankets for stock. A stealthy foray on some outlying settler's cattle and a quick disposal of the spoils on the reservation could be accomplished
despite the efforts of the chiefs and the white officials to
prevent it. And if life became too uninteresting an arrow
could be unloosened at some employe of the agency to provide a little amusement. But, along with the delinquents,
there were many others who could elicit favorable comment
for their general behavior and desire for peace. Hovlever,
after long contact with these savages, the average white
was more inclined to accept the view that "To sum up the
Apache he may be said to be the but-cut of original sin !"68
In the midst of the trials and tribulations at Tularosa,
and the known preference of the Indians for the Canada
Alamosa, the idea of another change in the location of the
reservation for the Gila gained ground. They had never yet
all collected together at their new home, the number varying from an average of 330 during the summer months to
67. Price to Willard, 2/28/74, W498/74.
The gov~rnment supports troops here "for the purpose, practically, of allowing
these Indians to steal and kill almost as freely as they did when on the war path.
They have been allowed to do this off the reservation so long, that lately they have
felt at liberty to threaten the lives of the men employed at the Agency to serve
them." Thomas to Price, 7/24/73, D417/73.
68', The Daily New Mexican, 10/3/72,
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663 in the winter. 69 Superintendent Dudley as early ~s
December, 1872, suggested removal to Fort Stanton in order
to save the cost of one military post and agency: Furthermore, it was pointed out that Tularosa lay too far west of
the line of frontier posts to permit proper control of the
Indians, and the short growing season made it difficult to
develop farming habits. Finally, in the spring of 1874, Dudley definitely recommended that Tularosa be abandoned and
that the Gila be brought back to Ojo Caliente (Warm
Springs) at the head of Cafiada Alamosa, where they would
be a bit farther away from the towns; the one settler closeby
could be bought out for $2,500. All in all it was the most
favorable place that he knew of for a reservation. Accordingly, a site was established by Executive Order, April 9,
1874:
Beginning at the ruins of an ancient pueblo in
the valley of the- Cafiada Alamosa River, about 7
miles above the present town of Cafiada Alamosa,
and running thence due east 10 miles; thence due
north 25 miles; thence due west 30 miles; thence
due south 25 miles; thence due east 20 miles to
the place of beginning. 70
After the Indians, to the number of about 400, had been
transferred to Ojo Caliente late in the summer of 1874,
Thomas was succeeded as agent in October by John M.
Shaw, who shouldered his new task in the spirit of Colyer.
He declined to have more than ten soldiers under a noncommissioned officer stationed at the agency, trusting to
his own ability to handle the savages rather than leaning
too heavily on the military. Aside from the chronic annoyance of the liquor traffic, he was quite optimistic about the
future, visualizing. the successful transforrnation of the
Apache into a settled people, more pastoral, however, than
agricultural in their economy. And the commissioner of
69. D499/73.
70. Kappler, I, 873. Fred G. Hughes to editor (The Borderer) , 2/11/74, in
D254/74. Dudley to Smith, 12/2/73, D889/73. Dudley to Smith, 5/11/74, 0566/74.
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Indian affairs stated that the Ojo Caliente agency was to be
permanent. 71
Conditions on the whole were favorable for the success
of the new reservation and plan of management.
Although it cannot he positively asserted that
there are no hostile Indians in New Mexico, nor
that some of these, now quiet, may not hereafter
cause trouble, yet it may be reasonably inferred
from the peaceable disposition at present generally manifested by the tribes both in New Mexico
and Arizona, that hostilities and difficulties to any
serious extent in either of these territories are not
likely to occur." 72
This happy note was echoed by the territorial governor the
following year: there had been no murders within the past
four years (not literally true), men could travel in safety,
and the flocks and herds of the people had increased; "This
blessing of profound peace we deeply appreciate." 73
But into this Garden of Eden an insidious serpent had
crept. Some people were not willing to let sleeping dogs lie.
Even while the change from Tularosa to Ojo Caliente was
being worked out, the suggestion had been advanced that
the Cochise band on the Chiricahua reservation should be
brought northward to this new location to keep them from
potential future raids into Mexico and provide them with a
suitable farming area, and the idea was also broached of
locating all the Apaches on the San Carlos reservation, the
same idea of concentration that had run all through the
course of Indian management in New Mexico. 74 pudley had
been authorized at one time to interview the former terror
of the Southwest to that end, but with the admonition that
71. ·Thomas to Smith, 8/31/74, C. 1. A., Annual Report, 1874, P. 310-311. Shaw
to Smith, 9/1/75, Ibid., 1875, p. 334-35. Shaw to. Smith, 11/30/74, S1134/75. B. 1. C.,
Annual Report, 1875, p. 96. And see LB 120, p. 343. Smith to Delano, 12/16/74.
RB 25, p. 259.
72.. Clum to W. H. Hart, 9/7/74, LB 120, p, 128.
73. New Mexico, Executive Records, 1867-1882, p. 227.
74. Dudley to Smith, 6/30/74, C. 1. A., Annual Report, 1874, p. 301-302. See
also T405/74.
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"In view of the many disappointments which Cochise has
experienced in his dealings with white men, it is very important that there should be strict observance of this caution;"
namely, that no definite promises should be made until the
Ojo Caliente site was finally approved. 75
In the spring of 1876, the era of peace approached an
end due to two· factors, the financial failure of the government to provide for the Indians at Ojo Caliente, and the final
d'ecision to remove the Cochise band to the San Carlos Reservation in Arizona. Shaw was instructed in February to
contract for no more beef for rations and to discharge the
agency employees at the close of the fiscal quarter. The
agent immediately protested, and justly so, that his charges.
would return to their old life if not fed. In April he wrote:
"My Indians are distressing me with their cries of want
and suffering for food; what .shaILLdo__to_nrevent an outbreak among them."76 A question that- dkr~ot receive an
immediate reply: "What I can do I do not know, I hear nothing from my strong appeals for assistance and instruction."77
The Indians remained hopeful for about a month that
full rations would again be issued, then they began to leave
the reservation. Also, at this time, April, the Chiricahua
Indians were moving northward to locate at Canada Alamosa, refusing to accept the decision to remove them to the
San Carlos reservation. In the face of this crisis the district
commander, Hatch, and Inspector Kemble of the Indian
bureau started for Canada Alamosa to handle the situation.
Troops were concentrated more rapidly than usual due to the
introduction of the telegraph and it was planned to intercept the old Cochise group before they reached their destination.
75. Smith to Dudley, 5/15/74, LB 118, p. 43.
These instructions were Boon after revoked, but the id~a was not abandoned.
LB 116, p. 461.
76. Shaw to Smith, 4/15/74, S330 76. Shaw to Elkins, 3/29/76, E45/76. Shaw
to Smith, 3/29/76, S270/76, and 4/6/76, S335/76.
77. Shaw to Smith, 4/17/76, S337/76.
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Hatch arrived at the reservation on the 20th and
found conditions conformed to Shaw's warnings. The
Indians that had not left were armed and in a defiant mood.
No beef had been issued for four weeks and they considered that relying on their own efforts for subsistence was
preferable to starving under gov.ernmental supervision.
Both the military authorities and Kemble authorized the
purchase of beef to keep them under control and the Indians
postponed their departure for the time being. But as a more
permanent solution of the difficulties, a new proposal was
advanced by Hatch; namely, that they should be disarmed
and dismounted to make impossible any return to their
former nomadic existence, forced to work, and kept under a
close surveillance by a daily count and issue of rations.
There was little game left to hunt so that they had no real
need of firearms or horses. The idea was not carried out at
the time and the logical corollary to such measures, scouting
parties to drive in the deserters, was postponed temporarily.
The officials were still fearful that strong arm measures
might result in a general exodus to Mexico. 78
With matters at Canada Alamosa temporarily straightened out, the plan to prevent the southern group from coming to the reservation was not accomplished. Those Indians
drifted in gradually during June and July to the number of
135. ' Shaw was confident that he could manage them although they showed signs of not having been subject to
much restraint by their former agent. In the face of a fait
accompli the Washington officials decided to let them remain.
having had apparently no conclusive reason for ordering
them sent to San Carlos in the first place. 79
During the summer and early fall conditions were not
settled. Supplies were uncertain, and when rations were
issued they were apt to be transferred illegally to the post
trader. Scouting parties were in the field and the military
78. Hatch to Pope, 4/16/76, W569/76. Sheridan to Townsend, 4/25/76. W499/76
Shaw to Smith, 5/8/76, S397/76. Hatch to A. A. G., 5/20/76, W703/76.
79. See S486/76, S530/76, S574/76, 8594/76, 1689/76, and RB 28', p. 277.
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were tempted to invade the reservation when on a hot pursuit; a possibility that actually happened in September. The
more lawless element in this frontier region considered the
Indians legitimate prey and at least once raided their stock.
And again the agent was changed; Shaw resigned in June
and his successor, James Davis, assumed charge in
October. 80
The new agent soon found his hands full. The corn
issue was discontinued to prevent the manufacture of tizwin,
and beef was issued in chunks rather than on the hoof to prevent sale. In order to make possible the orderly issue of
rations and to count the recipients he requested a company
of soldiers for the reservation, also recommending that the
Indians be disarmed and dismounted.. The military were
willing to afford all necessary protection, and heartily favored the disarming policy, but declined to station so many
troops at Ojo Caliente; all available forces were needed for
scouting, and stationing troops close to Indians had always
been a source of evil. 81 However, the former plan was being
revived for the disposal of these Indians: they were now to
be removed to the San Carlos reservation. 82
Agent Clum of the Arizona reservation was given discretionary powers in April, 1877, to carry out the new program. Accordingly, on May 1, the whole group, to the number of 453, started on their pilgrimage under the. close
supervision of troops and Indian police from San Carlos. 83
But "They might as well attempt to whistle down the wind
as to keep mounted and armed Indians on a reservation"84
against their will, or even unarmed. Indians, fora majority
80. D659/76, 8717/76, 8752/76, 8838/76, 8587/76, D44/77.
81. Davis to 8mith, 12/2/76, D639/76. Hatch to A. A. G., 1/10/77, W142/77.
Davis, Report, 45 Congo 2 sess. Hse Ex. Doc. 1, VIII, 558 (1800).
82. "The whole Indian trouble follows naturally from the vacillating course
pursued by high Indian officials, and the fraud notoriously 'practised bj.v the under
representatives of the Indian ring." Silver City Herald, in Weekly New Mexican,
10/2/77.
.
83. Smith to Clum; 4/17/77, LB 136, P. 77-78. Clum to commissioner, 9/18/77,
45 Congo 2 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. I, VIII, 430 (1800).
84. Governor Axtell, in New Mexico, Executive Records, 1867-1882, p. 324.
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of Clum's new charges proceeded to desert on the grounds
that being unarmed they were abused by the other Indians
there. Whatever the motive, they left and wandered over the
Navaho reservation seeking a haven and the military took
them in charge as undesirable prisoners of war. 85
An army escort took them back to Ojo Caliente in
November, there to remain until further plans could be made
for their disposal. They were forced to surrender their
ponies and submit to a daily count when rations were issued.
In February, the commission of Indian affairs recommended
that they be removed to Fort Sill, Indian Territory, because
of the high cost of beef and the general expense of maintaining the agency. The military vigorously opposed this
plan on the ground of the inadvisability of mixing too many
different Indians on one reservation, the old Steck point of
view. While this con'flict of opinion was being resolved, the
army grew tired of the responsibility of caring for the
savages and insisted that the Indian bureau take them over.
Sheridan even threatened to turn them loose if action was
not taken. Consequently, in the summer of 1878, the war
department was requested to turn them over to the agent
and provide a small escort for a second removal to the San
Carlos reservation. 86
The final decision to remove them to San Carlos again
met with an obstinate refusal, particularly from those who
followed Victorio. They fled to the mountains and the military were sent after them in full force. Under pressure from
their pursuers some of the fugitives sought peace and protection at Fort Stanton and in the summer of 1879 Victoria
and his followers did the same. The civil agencies also
85. W. Whitney t.o Hayt, 11/30/77, S1465/77.
Captain Horace Jewett to
A. A. G., 10/11/77, W1097/77.
. HThe Apaches in Southern New Mexico are precisely what they always have
been, and in my opinion, always will be. squalid, idle vagabonds" utterly worthless
and hopeles.... John Pope, Report, 9/15/77, 45 Congo 2 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. I, n, 61
(1794) .
36. Whitney to commissioner, 11/10/77, S1325/77. Hatch to A. A. G., 11/21/77,
W1238/77. Hayt to secretary of interior, 2/2/78, RB 30, p. 97; and 7/23/78, RB 31,
p. 84; 2/4/78, RB 30, !po 102. Schurz to secretary of war, 7/18/78, I1234/78. Sea
also W332/78, W463/78.
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swung into action and Victorio was indicted in Grant county
on three counts, a judicial move that was a factor in leading
him to again take to the hills. But there was no let up on
the part of the military to force them all onto a reservation,
and the end was soon drawing near for the southern Apache
as far as the territory of New Mexico was concerned. One
last bid was made by them for a peaceful solution to the
disagreement over their permanent location, but the bureau
of Indian affairs rejected it: "It is desired that the military·
authorities should dispose of them without interference
from us." The Indians would probably have accepted a
reservation at Ojo Caliente, but San Carlos never. In desperation they sought safety in Mexico, in the fall of 1880,
but the army there was on the alert and just as hostile as
the Americans. On October 14, the Indians were surrounded
in the Castillo mountains and nearly wiped out. 87
The struggle was a costly one. "During Victorio's Indian raidings over 300 lives of our citizens were sacrificed,
and horrors untold, perpetrated upon helpless women and
children, millions of property destroyed, business paralyzed
and immigration retarded ... this is no tale of fancy ... it
is all true."88 The final roundup of the Gila was yet to be
accomplished, but their home was not to be in New Mexico.
CONCLUSION

The reservation policy, first applied in New Mexico
with the abortive attempt made by Steck to locate the southern Apache at Lucia Springs in 1860, was carried to completion about 1880. Despite sundry attempts to move the nomadic Indians in New Mexico to reservations distant from
their native haunts, the government policy failed, and the
Indians now live in their traditional homeland: the Navaho
were located in northwestern New Mexico and northeastern
87. Brooks to Russell, 3/1/80, LB 154, p. 308. Russell to commissioner, 10/,18/79,
R771/79. Andrew Kelley to secretary of interior, 1/20/80, KI35/80.
Pope to
Sherman, 3/25/80, W625 80. Joaquin Terrasas to Buell, October, 188·0, W2360/80.
88. W. G. Ritch to S. J. Kirkwood, 8/22/81, ?
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Arizona, the southern Ute in southwestern Colorado, the
Jicarilla Apache in northcentral New Mexico, and the Mescalero Apache in southcentral New Mexico. The Gila
Apache were eventually located in Arizona.
The reservation policy was adopted with the idea that
segregation of the Indians from the white man was essential
for their preservation, and that the occupation of the Indian
country by the miner and settler was inevitable. The advance of the mining frontier was especially apparent in the
case of the Capote and Wiminuche Ute, and the Gila Apache.
The settler was the prime factor in regard to the removal of
the Jicarilla Apache and Moache Ute, and to a lesser extent
in the roundup of the Mescaleros. The basic cause for the
drastic treatment of the Navaho is to be found in the generations of chronic depredations on the settlements in the Rio
Grande valley. The interest of the miner and farmer in the
Navaho country was prospective, rather than actual, and
played little part in the final disposal of those Indians.
The gradual carrying out of the reservation policy
was marred by a confusion of interests and motives. The
government plans were based on the instinct of the humanitarian and marked by the callousness of the realist. Some
men in positions of responsibility had a genuine interest in
the welfare of the Indian, and looked toward his eventual
civilization; others, motivated by'; the practice of the spoils
system in American politics,profited from their position to
the fullest possible measure; the settlers were usually content to be free from the annoying proximity of the Indian,
since inadequate government supplies and a diminishing
supply of game made the nomad seek support from the
wealth of his white neighbors.
The government machinery for dealing with the Indians
was faulty to an extreme, and creaked and groaned with dis. cordant notes produced by lack of harmony between the
departments and the knavery of some of the agents. A division of responsibility between departments was adhered to
in theory throughout the period of two decades. On this
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basis the military were supposed to deal with hostile Indians
and the Indian bureau with peaceful Indians. In actual
practice the military were in complete charge for a short
time during the Civil War, and until November 1, 1867, in
the case of the Navaho. This was an unwanted responsibility, although there were some who favored turning the
whole of the Indian management over to the military. The
period of army control was ushered in with the determination to solve the Indian problem once and for all, and was
continued for several years, due to the failure of the civil
department to assume charge at the Bosque Redondo.
The process of turning the nomad into a settled farmer
was made more difficult, and resulted in some unnecessary
suffering on the part of the Indian, on account of the spoils
system, and the weakness for peculation which was prominent in the post-Civil War period. The sums of money
appropriated by congress were not very generous, and their
remedial effects were considerably lessened by the dishonesty of officials and the unscrupulousness of traders. Inferior and unnecessary articles were often purchased, and
perhaps as often traded off for a drink ·of whiskey. The
exact difference between the amount appropriated and the
value of the goods actually consumed or utilized by the Indians is not known, but in view of the chronic complaint
about starving, naked, and drunken Indians, the margin
must have been very wide.
The peace policy of President Grant was based on a
worthy motive, but it produced little tangible results in New
Mexico. The appointment of agents on the recommendations
of the various church denominations did not immediatelY
raise those offiCials above the suspicion of abusing their·
trusts. Nor did the economic and moral status of the Indian
show much improvement in the 1870s.
The outstanding event in Indian management in New
Mexico was the Bosque Redondo. experiment. The transplanting of about 8,000 souls, from one environment to another, was an herculean task and, if successful, would pave
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given the history of New Mexico a different turn. About
45,000 Indians, as the Navaho number today, would have
made considerable inroad into the Pecos valley territory
now occupied by farmers and cattle raisers with Democratic
party tenets struggling for control of the state government,
in opposition to the more Republican minded people in the
Rio Grande valley. And the experiment might have succeeded, if the superintendent of Indian affairs had not already formulated set plans for the establishment of the
Apache on the Pecos river. The unfortunate controversy
between Carleton and Steck was the first major obstacle to
success, because it sowed the seed of doubt as to whether
the project should be continued or abandoned, which prevented whole hearted support by the government.
The motive of Carleton in removing the Navaho to the
banks of the Pecos was worthy, but the plan had a basic
weakness. It did not take into consideration the inherent
difficulty, or almost impossibility, of changing the character
of a people overnight. The plan to transform the Navaho
into farmers, and settle them in villages after the manner of
the Pueblo Indians, ignored too much their traditional economy and habits. Although they cultivated the soil to a limited extent, they were and have remained a pastoral people.
More attention to restoring their flocks of sheep, and greater
utilization of their native abilities in making clothing, would
have greatly eased the pain of transplantation, because
material prqsperity brings contentment.
The application of the reservation policy to the nomadic
Indians in New Mexico, was marked by the same confusion
of good intentions and harshness of treatment that has
characterized the policy of the whites toward the Indians
throughout the history of the United States. This was fundamentally due to the fact that an aggressive, expanding
nation of civilized people, seeking a new homeland, came
into contact with a primitive people who claimed ownership
of a territory of great natural wealth. The wide differences
in customs, manners, and temperament that existed between
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the two groups, made a peaceful adjustment of their respective interests impossible in all instances. The stronger
naturally overwhelmed the weaker, and, unfortunately, justice was not always rendered in the process.
(The End)

